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Abstract
Given a number of patrollers that are required to detect an intruder in a channel, the channel
patrol problem consists of determining the periodic trajectories that the patrollers must trace
out so as to maximized the probability of detection of the intruder. We formulate this problem
as an optimal control problem. We assume that the patrollers’ sensors are imperfect and that
their motions are subject to turn-rate constraints, and that the intruder travels straight down
a channel with constant speed.
Using discretization of time and space, we approximate the optimal control problem with
a large-scale nonlinear programming problem which we solve to obtain an approximately sta-
tionary solution and a corresponding optimized trajectory for each patroller. In numerical tests
for one, two, and three underwater patrollers, an underwater intruder, different trajectory con-
straints, several intruder speeds and other specific parameter choices, we obtain new insight —
not easily obtained using simply geometric calculations — into efficient patrol trajectory design
under certain conditions for multiple patrollers in a narrow channel where interaction between
the patrollers is unavoidable due to their limited turn rate.
1
1 Introduction
This paper deals with the optimal detection of an underwater intruder in a channel using one or
more unmanned underwater vehicles (UUVs). In particular, it establishes optimal periodic patrol
trajectories for the UUVs, which we refer to as patrollers, that maximize the probability of detection
of an underwater intruder traveling straight down a channel at constant speed. While we focus on
an underwater intruder and patrollers, our general approach may also be applicable in the case of
other types of vehicles.
This problem is a multi-patroller extension of the classical “channel patrol problem” (also called
the barrier patrol problem); see, e.g., Section 1.3 of [16] and Chapter 9 of [15]. The channel patrol
problem for a single patroller was formulated by Koopman [8] during World War II and arises in
naval operations where the channel may represent a relatively narrow body of water such as a strait
or port entrance through which enemy vessels and submarines as well as smugglers and terrorists
may attempt to pass. The channel patrol problem may also arise in anti-submarine warfare in an
operating area around a carrier or naval expeditionary strike group [13] and then typically with
multiple patrollers. With the proliferation of small diesel submarines and the advent of UUVs
and self-propelled semi-submersibles the channel patrol problem has acquired new importance,
since these vessels are difficult to detect.1 The need to consider multiple patrollers is apparent,
especially in view of the development of small UUVs that may be used to guard channels.
The early studies by Koopman [8] and by Washburn [17] focus on the determination of the
probability of intruder detection for a single patrol trajectory consisting of piecewise linear segments;
see also Chapter 9 of [15]. (We refer the reader to [1] for a broad review of other problems in search
theory.) This approach results in simple formulae for the probability of detection and provides
insight into the effectiveness of “back-and-forth” versus “bow-tie” trajectories for various patroller
and intruder speeds. In reality, a vessel cannot carry out a perfect back-and-forth patrol trajectory
as it is unable to turn around instantaneously at the end of each channel crossing. These early
studies ignore the limited turn-radius of the patroller or use coarse approximations. Moreover,
they focus on a single patroller with the assumption that the case of multiple patrollers can be
solved by dividing the channel into subchannels, with one patroller assigned to each subchannel.
1Quoting from Daily Mail Online, November 11th, 2007, “American military chiefs have been left dumbstruck by
an undetected Chinese submarine popping up at the heart of a recent Pacific exercise and close to the vast U.S.S.
Kitty Hawk - a 1,000 ft super carrier with 4,500 personnel on board. By the time it surfaced the 160 ft Song Class
diesel-electric attack submarine is understood to have sailed within viable range for launching torpedoes or missiles
at the carrier,” by Matthew Hickley.
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This policy may become problematic when there are many patrollers in a narrow channel. In that
case, the limited turn radius of a patroller may force it to deviate greatly from the assigned, say,
back-and-forth trajectory.
In this study, we consider one or more patrollers, account for turn-radius limits and imperfect
sensors, and model the motion of the patrollers using ordinary differential equations. This formu-
lation leads to an optimal control problem with solution trajectories that are executable by UUVs.
Optimal control formulations of general search problems are found in [4] with later generalizations
in [11]; see also references therein. However, these studies deal with the general situation where
the intruder moves according to some diffusion process. We take advantage of the special structure
of the channel patrol problem and derive significantly simpler expressions, which allow us to carry
out a comprehensive numerical investigation of one, two, and three patrollers.
In Section 2 we derive a formula for the detection probability, in Section 3 we present the
optimal control formulation of the channel patrol problem, and in Section 4 we discuss a discretiza-
tion scheme for this optimal control problem. Numerical results are found in Section 5, which is
followed by our concluding remarks in Section 6. An Appendix generalizes the formulation and
discretization scheme of Sections 3 and 4 from 2-dimensional to 3-dimensional patrollers.
2 Detection Probability
We consider a scenario of patrolling a channel similar to the one in [17]: patrollers search a channel
of width L looking for a single intruder which is moving straight down the channel with constant
speed vI (see Figure 1). The intruder is unaware of the patrollers, makes no attempt to evade them,
and simply progresses straight down the channel with an unknown (to the patrollers) distance to the
sides of the channel. This assumption is reasonable when examining the situation before the intruder
detects the patrollers and vice versa, which is the focus of this paper. During this “detection phase”
neither side has much information about each other. The patrollers’ assumption about a straight
intruder trajectory is reasonable for at least two reasons: (i) submarines generate additional noise
and become more vulnerable to detection when turning and (ii) the shortest distance to “the end
of the channel” is along a straight line. Of course, after detection (one-sided or mutual), a pursuit-
evasion game starts. We do not consider that phase, which requires new models (see for example
[14, 9, 3]) and is better postponed to a follow-up paper.
We assume that the probability of detection, of the intruder by a patroller, depends on the
positions of the patroller and the intruder, the quality of the patroller’s sensor, and on the time
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Figure 1: Two patrollers (bottom) try to detect an intruder (top) in a channel
allowed for observation. We also could easily let the probability of detection depend on the speeds of
the intruder and patrollers, but ignore that possibility here to avoid complicated detection models.
(We do explore one effect of variable intruder speed in Section 5.)
Suppose that there are q patrollers looking independently for the intruder and that xˆk(t) ,
(x1k(t), x
2
k(t)) ∈ R2 is the position of the k-th patroller at time t, k = 1, 2, ..., q, see Figure 1 for
the case with q = 2. We use superscripts to denote components of a vector. We here assume
that the patrollers and the intruder do not vary their depth, which is the case, for example, in
a shallow channel where maneuverability in the depth-dimension may be limited. In other cases,
depth variations may be significant and should be accounted for in the model formulation. For
simplicity of exposition, we consider the 2-dimensional case in the main part of the paper, but
include an appendix summarizing the 3-dimensional model and discretization scheme.
We derive the expression for the probability of detection in two steps. First, we derive the
detection probability for a stationary intruder. Second, we extend that expression to the situation
at hand with a moving intruder in a channel. Hence, temporarily assume that the intruder is
stationary and located at y ∈ R2. Again, an extension of the following formulation to three
dimensions is trivial. Let rk(xˆk(t), y, t) ≥ 0, k = 1, 2, ..., q, denote the detection rate at time t
for the k-th patroller at xˆk(t) when the intruder is located at y. The detection rates reflect the
qualities of the patrollers’ sensors as described in more details below and are defined so that the
probability that the k-th patroller detects the intruder during a small time interval [t, t + ∆t)
is rk(xˆk(t), y, t)∆t. For theoretical and computational reasons, rk(·, ·, ·), k = 1, 2, ..., q, must be














































Figure 2: Detection rate function based on Poisson Scan Model (1).
We focus on patrollers that are UUVs and intruders that are diesel-electric submarines, and
assume that the patrollers’ sensors are sonars. A large class of sensor models can be handled by our
framework or minor adjustment thereof, but to avoid classified data we adopt the relative simple
Poisson Scan Model (see, e.g., [16] p. 3-1) to illustrate our approach. Hence, for the k-th patroller,
we set
rk(xˆk(t), y, t) = λΦ[{Fk − ρ(xˆk(t), y)}/σ], (1)
where Φ(·) is the standard normal cumulative distribution function, λ is the scan opportunity rate,
Fk is the “figure of merit” (a sonar characteristic), σ reflects the variability in the “signal excess,”
and ρ(xˆk(t), y) is the propagation loss, which depends on the distance between the patroller and
the intruder, see, e.g, Figure 4.5 on page 93 in [15]. All these quantities may be time dependent.
The typical shape of rk(xˆk(t), ·, t) is shown in Figure 2, where xˆ(t) = (0, 0) and ρ(xˆk(t), y) =
a‖xˆk(t)− y‖2 + b, with λ = 1, Fk = 70, σ = 5, a = 0.5, and b = 60. We now define the probability
that the k-th patroller does not detect the intruder during some time interval [0, T ] in terms of the
detection rate.
Given a trajectory {xˆk(t), 0 ≤ t ≤ T} and an intruder at y, we denote the probability that the
k-th patroller does not detect the intruder during [0, t], t ∈ [0, T ], by pk(y, t). Assuming that events
of detection in non-overlapping time intervals are all independent, we find that this probability can
be computed recursively by solving the difference equation
pk(y, t+∆t) = pk(y, t) (1− rk(xˆk(t), y, t)∆t) , pk(y, 0) = 1, (2)
5
or, as ∆t tends to zero, by solving the parameterized differential equation
dpk(y, t)
dt
= −pk(y, t)rk(xˆk(t), y, t), pk(y, 0) = 1, (3)
with solution





rk(xˆk(s), y, s)ds. (5)
The above derivation follows from standard arguments for Poisson processes and ηk(y, t) is the
mean value of the random number of detections at y, up to time t, by the k-th patroller, when that
number is given by a Poisson law.
Now, let φ : R2 → R be the probability density function of the location of the (stationary)
intruder at time 0, i.e., for any B ⊂ R2, ∫B φ(y)dy is the probability that the intruder is located
in the area B at time 0. This information may be provided by exogenous intelligence sources and
reflects the patrollers knowledge about the intruder prior to the start of the patrols. Then, the
















As it gives the probability that the k-th patroller does not detect the intruder during [0, t], the
function pk(·, t) reflects the patroller’s knowledge about the intruder’s location at time t and can
therefore be considered to be “information states” or “belief states” that augment the “physical
state” xˆk(t), k = 1, 2, ..., q.
The extension from a stationary intruder, as assumed above, to an intruder that moves straight
down a channel at constant speed, see Figure 1, is accomplished by a linear transformation as
described next.
As in [17], we fix the position of the intruder on a tape moving down the channel at the speed
of the intruder, vI . Hence, the intruder is stationary relative to the tape and the formulae derived
above are applicable. We only need to measure the patroller’s location relative to the tape. In
this framework, the probability of detection relates to the ratio of the rate at which the patroller
examines new area on the tape to the rate at which new tape area appears.
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k(t)) be the position vector of the k-th








We refer to xˆk(t) and zˆk(t) as the absolute and relative positions of the k-th patroller at time
t, respectively. We will use y for both the absolute and relative positions of the intruder as the
meaning is clear from the context.
Since the channel has width L, it suffices to consider relative intruder position y ∈ A(T ) ,
[0, L]×[0, vIT ] for patrols of duration T time units. Hence, it follows from (7) that given a trajectory
{zˆk(t), 0 ≤ t ≤ T}, the probability that the k-th patroller does not detect the intruder during time












where the probability density function of the relative position of the intruder takes the specific form
φ(y) = φ1(y1)/(vIT ), with φ
1(·) being the probability density function of the intruder’s y1-position
(i.e., the intruder’s horizontal position in Figure 1). For example, if the patrollers have no prior
knowledge of the y1-position of the intruder, then one can assume a uniform distribution across the
channel, i.e., φ1(y1) = 1/L for all y1 ∈ [0, L]. Note that we abuse the notation rk(·, ·, ·) slightly, by
using it to represent the detection rate function both in the absolute and in the relative positions.
We assume that the patrollers make independent detection attempts and hence it follows from
(4) and (5) that the conditional probability that no patroller detects the intruder given a specific












































We use this expression in an optimal control problem for determining patrol trajectories as
discussed next.
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3 Optimal Control Problem
Our objective is to find optimal closed trajectories for multiple patrollers that maximize the prob-
ability of detection of the intruder. In contrast to [17], we consider multiple patrollers whose turn
radius is constrained by their dynamics, in differential equation form, and available control action.
Thus we assume that the positions of the patrollers are states of a differential equation. Specifically,
we assume that the kinematic equations of all the patrollers are the same and are of the form
dxk(t)
dt
= f(xk(t), uk(t)), xk(0) = ξk, (12)
where the state xk(t) ∈ Rnx , the control uk(t) ∈ Rnu , f : Rnx × Rnu → Rnx is locally Lipschitz
continuous, and ξk is the initial condition of patroller k. We assume that the first two components
of the state, (x1k(t), x
2







′, where prime denotes the transpose of a vector. The assumption that
all patrollers are governed by the same kinematic equation is easily relaxed, but requires further
notation and is therefore avoided here.







′. We refer to xk(t) and zk(t) as absolute and relative states




= f˜(zk(t), uk(t)), zk(0) = ξk, (13a)
where
f˜(zk(t), uk(t)) , f(zk(t)− vIte2, uk(t)) + vIe2. (13b)
We let the patrol duration T be a decision variable. Hence, we introduce the time transforma-
tion t = Ts to enable us to define the channel patrol problem on the fixed time interval [0, 1]. For
simplicity of notation, we use the same notation for states and controls defined on [0, T ] as on the




= T f˜(zk(s), uk(s)), zk(0) = ξk. (14)
We denote the solution of (14) by zk(·;T, uk, ξk), as it clearly depends on the control input
{uk(s), s ∈ [0, 1]}, the time horizon T , and the initial condition ξk. Since the relative location
zˆk(t) of the k-th patroller is given by the first two components of zk(·;T, uk, ξk) evaluated at
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t/T , it also depends on {uk(s), s ∈ [0, 1]}, T , and ξk. Moreover, the probability P that no pa-
troller detects the intruder during the interval [0, T ] (see (11)) is a function of T and the relative
locations {zˆk(t), t ∈ [0, T ]}, k = 1, 2, ..., q. Consequently, P depends on T , {uk(s), s ∈ [0, 1]}
and ξk, k = 1, 2, ..., q, and to emphasize this dependence we write P (T, u, ξ) instead of P , where
u = (u1, u2, . . . , uq) and ξ = (ξ1, ξ2, . . . , ξq).
The optimal periodic patrol problem (OPPP) consists of maximizing the probability of detect-
ing the intruder during the time interval [0, T ], i.e., 1 − P (T, u, ξ), by choosing the best values of
T , u, and ξ. This leads to the following optimal control problem formulation:
OPPP : max{1− P (T, u, ξ)} (15a)
s.t. zk(1;T, uk, ξk) = g(ξk), k = 1, 2, ..., q, (15b)
zk(s;T, uk, ξk) ≤ zmaxk (s;T ), k = 1, 2, ..., q, s ∈ [0, 1], (15c)
zk(s;T, uk, ξk) ≥ zmink (s;T ), k = 1, 2, ..., q, s ∈ [0, 1], (15d)
T ∈ [Tmin, Tmax], (15e)
u ∈ U, (15f)
ξ ∈ X, (15g)
where g : Rnx → Rnx is a function that describes the end-state constraints, zmaxk (s; ·) : R → Rnx
and zmink (s; ·) : R → Rnx are upper and lower bounds on the state trajectories at scaled time s,
respectively, Tmin and Tmax are the minimum and maximum durations of a patrol, respectively, U
is the set of admissible controls, and X ⊂ Rnx ×· · ·×Rnx is the set of admissible initial conditions.
We note that the inequalities in (15c) and (15d) are componentwise. We assume that U is a convex
subset of the q-dimensional Cartesian product Lnu
∞,2[0, 1]×· · ·×Lnu∞,2[0, 1], where Lnu∞,2[0, 1] denotes
the pre-Hilbert space whose elements are functions from [0, 1] to Rnu, which are in Lnu
∞
[0, 1], i.e,
are sup-norm bounded, with inner product 〈u1, u2〉2 ,
∫ 1
0 〈u1(t), u2(t)〉dt and norm ‖ · ‖2 defined by
‖u‖2 = 〈u, u〉1/22 .2 Specifically, we let
U , {u = (u1, u2, ..., uq) | uk ∈ Lnu∞,2[0, 1], umink ≤ uk(s) ≤ umaxk ,∀s ∈ [0, 1], k = 1, 2, ..., q} (16)
where umink and u
max
k are the minimum and maximum control input at any point in time for the
k-th patroller.
2The reason for using this “hybrid” space is that our cost and constraint functions are differentiable on Lnu
∞,2
[0, 1],
but they are not necessarily differentiable on the well-know space Lnu
2
[0, 1] of Lebesgue square-integrable functions
with the same scalar product and norm; see Section 5.6 in [12].
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We use the constraints (15b) to ensure that the patrollers’ trajectories are closed. The con-
straints (15c) and (15d) are set up to contain the trajectories of the patrollers to be within a time-
varying box. The constraint (15e) limits the duration of a patrol. The constraints (15f) and (15g)
ensure that the control input and initial conditions satisfy specific constraints. We note that the
dynamics (14) are implicitly accounted for through the definition of P (T, u, ξ) and zk(·;uk, T, ξk),
k = 1, 2, ..., q.
We replace the “running cost” exp(− ∫ T0 ∑qk=1 rk(zˆk(t), y, t)dt) in (11) with an “end cost”
using an auxiliary information state p(y, s) to facilitate the evaluation of this integral by the same
numerical integration technique used to solve the dynamic equations (14). For any y ∈ R2, let






rk(zˆk(s), y, T s), p(y, 0) = 1. (17)
In view of (3), p(y, s) is the probability that no patroller has detected the intruder during the time
interval [0, T s] given that the intruder is located at y. It generalizes the information state pk(y, t)
to the case of multiple patrollers, relative locations, and scaled time.
In this notation,




where p(y, 1) is given by (17) and computed using T , u, and ξ, and A , [0, L] × [0, vI ]. Note
that similarly to the change from the time interval [0, T ] to the scaled time interval [0, 1], the area
A(T ) = [0, L]× [0, vIT ] is replaced by the scaled area A.
The numerical solution of OPPP requires the discretization of the time interval [0, 1] and of
the area A, as we describe in the next section.
4 Discretization
We consider the time and space discretizations in turn. First, we deal with the discretization of
the rectangular area A, using a N1 by N2 grid defined by
y1i = i∆1 and y
2
j = j∆2, (19)
where ∆1 = L/N1, ∆2 = vI/N2, i = 0, 1, . . . , N1, and j = 0, 1, . . . , N2. We also define center points








for i = 1, 2, . . . , N1 and j = 1, 2, . . . , N2.
Let pij(s) , p(y
(i,j)








c , T s), pij(0) = 1. (21)
This discretization approach works with any spatial discretization scheme. For example, if the
given problem is to find a patrolling trajectory inside a closed area with an arbitrary shape, one
can use a triangular mesh grid.
Second, we consider discretization of the dynamics in time. We follow the procedure described
in [12] and use Euler’s method with time step ∆ = 1/N , N a positive integer, to obtain the
discretized dynamics of (14) and (21):
zk((l + 1)∆)− zk(l∆) = ∆T f˜(zk(l∆), uk(l∆)), zk(0) = ξk, (22a)
for k = 1, 2, ..., q and





c , T l∆), pij(0) = 1, (22b)
for i = 1, 2, . . . , N1 and j = 1, 2, . . . , N2, with l = 0, 1, . . . , N − 1.









where u¯l,k ∈ RNu is the control input for the k-th patroller at scaled time l∆, k = 1, 2, ..., q. Here
and below we use bar notation to indicate discretized quantities. Also, let















To ensure norm-preservation between the infinite-dimensional input u(·) and the discretized input
u¯, we scale u¯ with the time-discretization level and let uk(l∆) =
√
Nu¯l,k for all l = 0, 1, ..., N − 1
and k = 1, 2, ..., q; see pp. 722-723 in [12].
Finally, let z¯l,q be the k-th patroller’s approximate state at time step l when using both the
discretized dynamics (22a) and the discretized input (23b). That is, for any for k = 1, 2, ..., q and
for l = 0, 1, ..., N − 1, let
z¯l+1,k − z¯l,k = ∆T f˜(z¯l,k,
√
Nu¯l,k), z¯0,k = ξk. (24a)
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Similarly, let p¯l,ij be the approximate probability that no patroller has detected the intruder up to
time step l, given that the intruder is located in the discretized area represented by y
(i,j)
c . Then we
see that p¯l,ij satisfies the difference equation,





c , T l∆), pij(0) = 1, (24b)
for i = 1, 2, . . . , N1 and j = 1, 2, . . . , N2, with l = 0, 1, . . . , N − 1. Here ˆ¯zl,k denotes the first two
components of z¯l,k.
We emphasize that z¯l,k depends on T , u¯·,k, and ξk by writing z¯l,k(T, u¯·,k, ξk) instead of z¯l,k.
In view of (18), the approximation of P (T, u, ξ), denoted by PN,N1,N2(T, u¯, ξ), using the above
discretization scheme takes the form








Hence, for any positive integers N , N1, and N2, the time-and-space discretization of OPPP
takes the form
OPPP(N,N1, N2) : max {1− PN,N1,N2(T, u¯, ξ)} (26a)
s.t. z¯N,k(T, u¯·,k, ξk) = g(ξk), k = 1, 2, ..., q, (26b)
z¯l,k(T, u¯·,k, ξk) ≤ zmaxl,k (T ), k = 1, 2, ..., q, l = 0, 1, ..., N, (26c)
z¯l,k(T, u¯·,k, ξk) ≥ zminl,k (T ), k = 1, 2, ..., q, l = 0, 1, ..., N, (26d)
T ∈ [Tmin, Tmax], (26e)




N ], k = 1, 2, ..., q, l = 0, 1, ..., N − 1, (26f)
ξ ∈ X, (26g)
where zmaxl,k (T ) = z
max
k (l∆;T ) and z
min
l,k (T ) = z
min
k (l∆;T ). The constraints (26b)-(26d) and (26f)
are discretized versions of the corresponding constraints in OPPP.
The problem OPPP(N,N1, N2) has a large number of decision variables, and the dimension
of the underlying augmented discrete dynamics (24a) and (24b) is also large. Specifically, the
dimension of the dynamics is nxq+N1N2 as seen from (24a) and (24b), and the number of decision
variables in OPPP(N,N1, N2) is Nnuq + nxq + 1, i.e., number of control inputs plus number of
initial conditions and plus the one-dimensional patrol duration.
To solve OPPP(N,N1, N2), one can use collocation methods [2], which treat the control
and the state as independent variables. Although, in this case, the gradient computations become
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relatively simple, the resulting nonlinear programming problem has a large number of variables and
a large number of nonlinear (collocation) equality constraints, representing the dynamics. Since the
dimension of the augmented discrete dynamics is, normally, quite large, using collocation methods
would result in serious numerical difficulties unless a solver specialized in dealing with a large
number of sparse collocation constraints is used. The pseudospectral method, also known as the
orthogonal collocation method [6] may reduce the size of N , and therefore the number of variables
and discretized constraints. However, it has only been validated for the solution of optimal control
problems with continuous optimal controls, but our patrolling problem results in discontinuous
optimal controls. Hence we prefer to use the method presented in Chapter 4 of [12], which regards
only control inputs, initial conditions, and end time as decision variables. Numerical results based
on this approach are presented in the next section.
5 Numerical Results






′ ∈ R3, i.e., nx = 3, where (x1k(t), x2k(t)) represent the absolute location of the k-th
patroller, as before, and x3k represents its heading. We assume that all patrollers move at constant
speed v. The control input for the k-th patroller uk ∈ R is its yaw rate, i.e., nu = 1. This leads to









k = 1, 2, ..., q. This planar kinematic model describes underwater vehicles that navigate at a
constant depth and a constant forward speed with variable yaw rate. In [7], a similar model was
suggested for use with underwater vehicles, but they regarded the vehicle’s yaw rate as a function
of vehicle’s forward speed and steering angle.



















for some n = 0, 1, 2, .... This ensure that the absolute location and heading of the patroller at time
T is the same as at time 0. The integer n is a variable that determines the number of 360-degree
rotations that are required during a patrol and hence, as we will shortly see, it largely determines
the shape of the trajectory. Since we cannot deal with mixed integer programming, we will resolve
the problem for n = 0, 1, 2, .... In fact, it soon becomes apparent that one can expect the largest
probability of detection for the values n = 0, 1.
We set the state-trajectory constraints zmink (s;T ) = (0, vIsT − γ,−∞)′ and zmaxk (s;T ) =
(L, vIsT + γ,∞)′ for k = 1, 2, ..., q, where γ > 0 is a constant that we vary below. We note
the state-trajectory constraints imply that z1k(s) ∈ [0, L], i.e., the patrollers stay within the chan-
nel and z2k(s) ∈ [−γ + vIsT, γ + vIsT ], i.e., x2k(t) ∈ [−γ, γ]. Hence, the last constraint limits
how much the patrollers can travel up and down the channel. The control input limits umaxk = 1
and umink = −1 for k = 1, 2, ..., q. We let the constraint set on the initial conditions be given by
X = {ξ ∈ R3 | 0 ≤ ξ1 ≤ L, ξ2 = 0, ξ3 ∈ R}.
We set the channel width L = 20, where one unit of length equals 1000 yards, and the intruder
speed vI = 3, and the patroller speed v = 1. We assume that one unit of time equals 0.1 hours.
Hence, the intruder and patrollers move at approximately 15 knots and 5 knots, respectively.
Moreover, the control input limits mean that the patrollers change their headings with at most
one radian per 0.1 hour. We always use Tmin = 5 and hence we do not consider patrols of shorter
duration that 0.5 hours. We vary Tmax. We use the detection rate function (1) with parameters
as given below that equation. Hence, the detection rate function is as in Figure 2. If not stated
otherwise, we assume that the distribution of the intruder’s y1-location is uniform, i.e., φ1(y1) =
1/L. We set the discretization levels with N = 128 and N1 = N1 = 32. For the above parameter
values, the augmented discrete dynamics are of dimension 1027, 1030, and 1033 for one, two, and
three patrollers, respectively. The number of decision variables is 132, 263, and 394 for one, two,
and three patrollers, respectively.
Finally, we use SNOPT version 6.2 [10] in TOMLAB MATLAB toolbox [5] as our nonlinear
programming solver, running on a desktop computer with two AMD Opertron 2.2GHz processors
with 8GB RAM, running Linux 2.6.28. We use SNOPT default parameters.
Next we describe the results of several numerical studies involving one, two, and three pa-
trollers. As the numerical results depend on the geometry of the channel, characteristics of the
patrollers, and their sensors, the obtained trajectories are only illustrations of output from the
proposed methodology.
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Figure 3: Case 1: Initial trajectory (dotted line) and optimized trajectory (solid line) of a single
patroller with no rotation (n = 0 in (28b)). The arrows indicate direction of travel for the patroller.
The white triangle denotes initial position and heading before the optimization, and the black























Figure 4: Case 1: Coverage of channel before (left) and after (right) optimization in relative
locations as measured by the probability of no detection p¯N,ijφ(y
(i,j)
c ); see (25). Shades of gray
represent different probability levels with black being 0 and white 1.
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Figure 5: Case 2: Initial trajectory (dotted line) and optimized trajectory (solid line) of a single
patroller with 360-degree rotation (n = 1 in (28b)).
Case n γ Tmax T ∗ P ∗
1 0 L/10 25 24.001 0.43348
2 1 L/10 25 23.568 0.43300
3 2 L/10 25 25.000 0.43243
4 0 L/5 15 15.000 0.42462
5 1 L/5 15 15.000 0.42620
Table 1: Summary of numerical results for a single patroller and varying number of rotations n (see
(28b)), vertical range γ, and patrol-duration limit Tmax. T ∗ and P ∗ are optimized patrol duration
and probability of detection, respectively.
5.1 One Patroller
Table 1 provides numerical results for a single patroller, i.e., q = 1, for several values of the number
of rotations n (see (28b)), vertical trajectory constraint γ, and maximum patrol duration Tmax.
In cases 1-3, γ = L/10 = 2, i.e., the patroller cannot move vertically (in Figure 1) more than two
units above or below its starting point. Moreover, in cases 1-3, the patrol duration is limited to
Tmax = 25. Case 1 requires the patroller to return to the same heading at the end of the patrol
(i.e., no rotation is allowed and n = 0 in (28b)) forcing the optimized trajectory to have a “bow-tie”
shape, as displayed in Figure 3 (solid line). Since OPPP(N,N1, N2) may be nonconvex, we cannot
guarantee that the control input that generates this trajectory or those reported below are globally
16












Figure 6: Case 3: Initial trajectory (dotted line) and optimized trajectory (solid line) of a single
patroller with 720-degree rotation (n = 2 in (28b)).
optimal. However, the optimized control inputs and corresponding trajectories satisfy the default
stopping criterion of SNOPT and hence are close to a stationary solution of OPPP(N,N1, N2).
Figure 3 also displays the initial trajectory prior to optimization (dotted line). The arrows in Figure
3 as well as all other figures indicate the direction of travel for the patroller. Large white and black
triangles denote initial positions and headings before and after optimization, respectively. Since the
patroller’s sensor range is roughly 5 units (see Figure 2), the optimized trajectory is stretched out so
that the sensor effectively reaches both sides of the channel. The initial trajectory has probability of
detection 0.42145 and length of patrol 15, while the corresponding optimized numbers are 0.43348
and 24.001 as listed under T ∗ and P ∗ in Table 1.
Figure 4 illustrates the “coverage” of the channel in Case 1. Specifically, it displays the
probability of no detection p¯N,ijφ(y
(i,j)
c ) at various relative locations (i, j). In the left portion of
Figure 4, giving the probabilities for the initial trajectory, large areas are not “covered” and thereby
allowing the intruder a high chance of success. For the optimized trajectory (right portion), the
situation is somewhat improved. Though, visually this may be difficult to identify.
Case 2 in Table 1 is identical to Case 1 but requires a 360-degree heading change at the
end of one patrolling period (i.e., n = 1). Hence, the patroller must return to a heading shifted
360 degrees from the initial heading, which excludes a “bow-tie” type trajectory, but is compatible
with a “racetrack” type trajectory. Figure 5 shows the corresponding initial trajectory (dotted line,
probability of detection is 0.42587) and optimized trajectory (solid line, probability of detection is
17












Figure 7: Case 4: Initial trajectory (dotted line) and optimized trajectory (solid line) of a single
patroller with no rotation (n = 0 in (28b)) and patrol duration restriction.
0.43300). We note that the optimized probability of detection is slightly worse for n = 1 than for
n = 0, 0.43348 versus 0.43300.
Case 3 in Table 1 is identical to Case 1 but requires two rotations (i.e., n = 2), which rules out
both “bow-tie” and “racetrack” type trajectories. In this case, the initial heading must be shifted
by 720 degrees and hence the patroller makes two loops as shown in Figure 6. The probability of
detection is again slightly worse than for n = 0 and n = 1. Since the probability of detection seems
to decrease as the number of rotations increases, we will, as a heuristic, restrict ourselves to the
problems with n = 0 and 1.
In Cases 1 and 2, the patrol-duration limit Tmax is not active. In Cases 4 and 5 this limit is
reduced to 15 and also the vertical movement restriction γ is relaxed to L/5 = 4. We see from
Table 1 that these changes impose a restriction on the patroller and the probability of detection
worsens. Figures 7 and 8 show the resulting trajectories. We see that the worsened probability of
detection is caused by the fact that the shorter patrol duration prevents the patroller from reaching
the sides of the channel.
We also consider a situation (Case 6) where the distribution of the intruder’s y1-location is not
uniform. Suppose that φ1(y1) = 2y1/L. Hence, we assume that the intruder is more likely to travel
down the channel near the right side than the left side in Figure 1. Figure 9 shows the optimized
trajectory for this case with no rotation required (n = 0), γ = L/10, and Tmax = 25. We see that
in this case the patroller prefers a “double figure eight” trajectory close to the right side of the
18












Figure 8: Case 5: Initial trajectory (dotted line) and optimized trajectory (solid line) of a single
patroller with 360-degree rotation (n = 1 in (28b)) and patrol duration restriction.












Figure 9: Case 6: Initial trajectory (dotted line) and optimized trajectory (solid line) of a single
patroller with no rotation (n = 0 in (28b)) and right-leaning triangular intruder-location distribu-
tion.
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Figure 10: Zoomed-in solution trajectories with varying vI and n = 0 (see (28b)). For ease of
comparison, the trajectories are slightly translated so that the crossing points of the trajectories
are at the origin.
channel. The optimized trajectory has duration 25.000 and significantly improves the probability
of detection to 0.61374 from the initial probability of detection of 0.42449.
We return to the situation with a uniform intruder distribution and consider the effect of
variable intruder speed. Table 2 presents Cases 7-12 involving different intruder speeds and numbers
of rotation. We assume that detection rate is as above, even though a slower intruder may be
quieter and therefore harder to detect under certain circumstance. In all of these cases γ = L/10
and Tmax = 25. Rows two and three of Table 2 restate the results for Cases 1 and 2 from Table 1, in
which the intruder speed vI = 3, for ease of comparison. Rows four and five give results for vI = 2.
Naturally, as the intruder speed reduces, the probability of detection increases, while the shapes of
trajectories remain qualitatively similar (Figure 10). This effect is further observed for the Cases
9 and 10 (vI = 1) and for Cases 11 and 12 (vI = 0.5). We note that in all cases the constraint of
no rotation (n = 0) results in better probability of detection than the requirement of a 360-degree
rotation (n = 1). These results are qualitatively different from the “idealized” results obtained in
[15], Chapter 9, which do not account for turn radius constraints of the patroller. There we see that
a “back-and-forth” trajectory similar to the one in Figure 5 (n = 1), but with infinitely sharper
turns, is better than a “bow-tie” trajectory similar to that in Figure 3 (n = 0) whenever v/vI is
less than 1.8. Since Cases 1, 2, 7-10 involve smaller v/vI ratios, the “idealized” results would lead
to the conclusion that a “back-and-forth” trajectory would be best. However, our numerical results
show that the bow-tie trajectory (n = 0) is better when the patroller is constrained by its turn
radius.
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12 1 25.000 0.86413
Table 2: Summary of numerical results for a single patroller, varying intruder speed vI , and number
of rotations n (see (28b)), with γ = L/10 and Tmax = 25. T ∗ and P ∗ are optimized values of patrol
duration and probability of detection, respectively.
5.2 Two Patrollers
Next we consider two patrollers, i.e., q = 2, and five additional cases as summarized in Table
3. In all of these cases the patrol-duration limit Tmax = 25. Rows two and three of Table 3
give the optimized patrol duration and probability of detection for no rotation (n = 0) and 360-
degree rotation (n = 1), respectively, using γ = L/10. Figures 11 and 12 give the corresponding
trajectories. We see again that no rotation (Case 13) results in better probability of detection.
Figure 11 shows that the optimized trajectories are similar to “figure eights,” even though the
initial trajectories are similar to the infinity symbol. This effect is caused by the narrowness of
the channel. The two patrollers obtain better probability of detection and less overlap in their
“coverage” by moving along the channel instead of across. The probability of detection for the
initial trajectory is 0.78003 and improves to 0.82037 after optimization.
We observe that the trajectories in Figure 11 are different for the two patrollers, which may
be counterintuitive as the distribution of the intruder’s y1-location is uniform. Additional calcula-
tions show that the trajectories in Figure 11 yield a larger probability of detection (0.82037) than
patrol plans consisting of identical but translated trajectories for both patrollers. If the right-most
patroller mimics the left-most patroller in Figure 11, but on the right side of the channel, then the
probability of detection deteriorates to 0.81630. If the left-most patroller mimics the right-most
patroller, then the probability of detection deteriorates to 0.81472. The probabilities deteriorate
further when the patrollers carry out identical but mirror-imaged trajectories. These results provide
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Figure 11: Case 13: Initial trajectories (dotted line) and optimized trajectories (solid line) of two
patrollers with no rotation (n = 0 in (28b)).
new insight that is not easily obtained using the idealized calculations of [15], Chapter 9.
The optimized trajectories of Case 14 with the constraint of one rotation (i.e., n = 1) (see
Figure 12) yield a probability of detection of 0.79340, which is worse than in Case 13 (i.e., n = 0).
Figure 13 illustrates the coverage of the channel in this case. We note that the initial trajectory (left
portion of Figure 13) leaves some locations poorly covered. The optimized trajectory is somewhat
better in that regard as shown by the right portion of Figure 13.
We also examined the configuration with one patroller constrained to no rotation (n = 0) and
the other one to a 360-degree rotation (n = 1), and denote it by Case 15; see Figure 14. However,
the resulting probability of detection (0.81234) is worse than in Case 13.
Cases 16 and 17 in Table 3 show results similar to those for Cases 13 and 14, but for γ = L/5.
With this relaxation of the vertical movement constraint for the patrollers, we obtain slightly better
probability of detection. The relaxation allows for more complicated patrol trajectories as shown in
Figures 15 and 16. We see that the patrollers stagger vertically their trajectories to avoid overlap
and therefore increase the probability of detection. While not easily seen from Figures 15 and 16,
the patrollers also synchronize their progress along their trajectories so that when one patroller
moves to the left, say, then the other tends to move to the left also to fill the gap between the
patrollers. Figures 17 and 18 illustrate this effect by showing the coverage map and the relative
locations of the patrollers during t ∈ [0, T ] for Case 17, respectively. Such insight about the
coordination between multiple patrollers cannot be reached through single-patroller analysis. The
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Figure 12: Case 14: Initial trajectories (dotted line) and optimized trajectories (solid line) of two






















Figure 13: Case 14: Coverage of channel before (left) and after (right) optimization similar to
Figure 4.
23












Figure 14: Case 15: Initial trajectories (dotted line) and optimized trajectories (solid line) of two
patrollers with no rotation (n = 0) and one rotation (n = 1) in (28b) and relaxed vertical trajectory
constraint.












Figure 15: Case 16: Initial trajectories (dotted line) and optimized trajectories (solid line) of two
patrollers with no rotation (n = 0 in (28b)) and relaxed vertical trajectory constraint.
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Case n γ T ∗ P ∗
13 0 L/10 25.000 0.82037
14 1 L/10 11.633 0.79340
15 0,1 L/10 25.000 0.81234
16 0 L/5 25.000 0.82354
17 1 L/5 25.000 0.81594
Table 3: Summary of numerical results for two patrollers, varying number of rotations n (see (28b)),
and vertical range γ. T ∗ and P ∗ are the optimized patrol duration and probability of detection,
respectively. For all cases in the table the patrol-duration limit Tmax = 25.












Figure 16: Case 17: Initial trajectories (dotted line) and optimized trajectories (solid line) of two
patrollers with 360-degree rotation (n = 1 in (28b)) and relaxed vertical trajectory constraint.
initial trajectories in Case 17 result in a probability of detection of 0.77806, which is improved to
0.81594 after optimization.
5.3 Three Patrollers
Finally, we consider three patrollers briefly, for the single case of Tmax = 25, γ = L/10, and no
rotation constraint (n = 0). The optimized probability of detection is 0.94086, improved from
0.90335 for the initial trajectories, and the optimized patrol duration is T ∗ = 25.000. Figures 19
and 20 display the initial and optimized trajectories in absolute locations and in terms of coverage,
























Figure 17: Case 17: Coverage of channel before (left) and after (right) optimization similar to
Figure 4.






















patrollers with absolute location given in Figure 16.
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Figure 19: Case 18: Initial trajectories (dotted line) and optimized trajectories (solid line) of three
patrollers with no rotation (n = 0 in (28b)) constraint.
two patrollers; see Figure 11. We note that for two and three patrollers the optimized trajectories
tend to become quite intricate, especially when the patrollers are tightly constrained vertically
with γ = L/10 and no rotation is required (n = 0). This effect is caused by the fact that multiple
patrollers make it suboptimal for each patroller to search across the whole channel. This would
have caused substantial overlap between the patrollers and a lower probability of detection. Hence,
each patroller is effectively confined to a smaller area of operations. Even in the smaller area,
the patrollers tend to prefer longer patrol durations and the constraint T ≤ Tmax is often active.
Longer patrol durations are usually preferable as the constraint that the patroller’s relative final
state must match its relative initial state (possibly with a rotational shift) imposes a restriction
on the patroller and the longer duration allows more “free” movement between those “boundary
conditions.”
6 Conclusions
We formulated the channel patrol problem for multiple patrollers subject to turn-rate constraints
as an optimal control problem. In this problem, the patrollers aim to maximize the probability
of detecting an intruder that travels straight down a channel with constant speed. Using dis-
cretization of time and space, we obtained a large-scale nonlinear programming approximation of
























Figure 20: Case 18: Coverage of channel before (left) and after (right) optimization similar to
Figure 4.
optimized trajectory for each patroller. In numerical tests specifically tailored to one, two, and
three underwater patrollers, an underwater intruder, different trajectory constraints, and several
intruder speeds, we found that simple “back-and-forth” trajectories across the channel are inferior
to more complicated, optimized trajectories. For a single patroller, the optimized trajectories tend
to have the shape of a bow tie for a variable range of intruder speeds. The optimized trajectory
changes shape to a “double figure eight” when the intruder is known to bias its route to one side
of the channel. For two patrollers, the optimized trajectories also take the shape of “double figure
eights,” which may be staggered when the trajectory constraints allow sufficient movement along
the channel. For three patrollers, the optimized trajectories again resemble “double figure eights.”
The optimized probability of detecting an intruder at 15 knots in a channel of width 20,000 yards
using three patrollers at 5 knots with an imperfect sensor of range approximately 5,000 yards is
0.94. That probability is reduced to 0.82 and 0.43 for two and one patrollers, respectively.
The results of this study provide new insight, not easily obtained using geometric calculations,
into efficient patrol trajectory design for multiple patrollers in a narrow channel where interaction
between the patrollers is unavoidable due to their limited turn rate. The insight comes at a sub-
stantial computational cost as the large-scale nonlinear programming approximations may require
many days to solve using standard hardware and software due to expensive function and gradient
evaluations as well as poor conditioning. We believe it is possible to obtain significant reductions
28
in computing times, but defer such efforts to future studies.
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Appendix
In this appendix we describe a 3-dimensional extension of the model and discretization scheme
presented in Sections 2-4.






k(t)) ∈ R3 and zˆk(t) , (z1k(t), z2k(t), z3k(t)) ∈ R3 be the











Suppose that the channel has width L1 and depth L3. Then, it suffices to consider relative intruder
position y ∈ A(T ) , [0, L1]× [0, vIT ]× [0, L3] for patrols of duration T time units. The probability
that no patroller detects the intruder during [0, T ] then takes the same form as (11), but with
zˆk(t) ∈ R3, y ∈ R3, φ(y) = φ1(y1)φ3(y3)/(vIT ), with φ3(y3) being the probability density function
of the intruder’s depth and rk(·, ·, ·) being the obvious extension of the detection rate function to
three dimensions. The problem formulation OPPP remains identical after the changes discussed
above with an integration over the volume A = [0, L1]× [0, vI ]× [0, L3] in (18).
The discretization scheme in three dimension takes the following form. We now use N1 by N2
by N3 grid points defined by
y1i1 = i1∆1 and y
2
i2 = i2∆2 and y
3
i3 = i3∆3, (30)
where ∆1 = L1/N1, ∆2 = vI/N2, ∆3 = L3/N3, ij = 0, 1, . . . , Nj , and j = 1, 2, 3. We also define
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for ij = 1, 2, . . . , Nj and j = 1, 2, 3.
Let pi1i2i3(s) , p(y
(i1,i2,i3)








c , T s), pi1i2i3(0) = 1. (32)
The discretization of the dynamics in time takes the form (22a) and





c , T l∆), pi1i2i3(0) = 1, (33)
for ij = 1, 2, . . . , Nj , j = 1, 2, 3, and l = 0, 1, . . . , N −1. The discretized control input is identical to
the 2-dimensional case. The patroller’s approximate state when using both the discretized dynamics
and the discretized input is as in (24a). The approximate probability that no patroller has detected
the intruder up to time step l, given that the intruder is located in the discretized area represented
by y
(i1,i2,i3)
c is given by p¯l,i1i2i3 , which satisfies the difference equation





c , T l∆), pi1i2i3(0) = 1, (34)
for ij = 1, 2, . . . , Nj , j = 1, 2, 3, and l = 0, 1, . . . , N−1. Here ˆ¯zl,k denotes the first three components
of z¯l,k. The approximate probability (25) generalizes to










Hence, the time-and-space discretization of OPPP in three dimensions takes the same form as
OPPP(N,N1, N2), but with PN,N1,N2(T, u¯, ξ) replaced by PN,N1,N2,N3(T, u¯, ξ).
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